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The Reverse of Anosognosia?
Frédérique de Vignemont
IntroductIon
H ysteria has been the subject of controversy for many years, with theorists arguing about whether it is best explained by a hidden organic cause or by malingering and deception. However, it has been shown that hysterical 
paralysis cannot be explained in any of these terms. With the recent development 
of cognitive psychiatry, one may understand psychiatric and organic delusions 
within the same conceptual framework. Here i contrast hysterical conversion 
with anosognosia. they are indeed remarkably similar, though the content of their 
respective delusions is the opposite. in hysterical paralysis, patients are not aware 
of their preserved ability, whereas in anosognosia for hemiplegia, patients are not 
aware of their disability. Four main explanations have been provided to account 
for anosognosia: metacognitive, attentional, motor, and motivational views. i will 
apply each of these accounts to hysterical paralysis and show that, at each level, 
hysterical conversion is the reverse of anosognosia. i will suggest that hysterical 
paralysis results from the interaction between attentional somatosensory amplifi-
cation and affective inhibition of action.
effingham felt paralyzed. He could not, as gerald receded along the lighted 
corridor, have lifted a finger or uttered a sound.…He was paralyzed, like a 
creature bitten by an insect or a snake, and lying there living, breathing, and 
waiting to be eaten. (murdoch, 1963, p. 185)
murdoch’s The Unicorn is a story of paralyzed stillness, of people who should 
act and do nothing, although they want to. intense fear sometimes makes us freeze 
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as if we were paralyzed, like effingham. We know that we have no motor deficit, 
but we feel that we cannot move an inch. Luckily, this temporary paralysis does 
not last long. We get over it and we do not conclude that there is something wrong 
in us just because we feel a rigid coldness in our limbs. Patients with hysterical 
conversion may feel like effingham. As much as they might wish to, they cannot 
move. However, their functional paralysis perseveres and hysterical patients are 
convinced that it is due to an organic cause despite evidence to the contrary. they 
are unaware of their preserved ability to move.
When asked to raise your left arm, you can do it; even before you perform the 
required movement, you know that you can do it. You do indeed know that you are 
not paralyzed and that you are free to move without constraint. Hysterical patients 
lack such metacognitive awareness of their abilities. Another type of patient also 
displays a disruption of the ability awareness: patients with anosognosia. they pres-
ent the reverse pattern of hysterical patients. Although they are organically para-
lyzed, they feel that they can move. they are not aware of their disability. But is 
the basis of the awareness of one’s disability the same as the basis of the awareness 
of one’s ability? if so, one would expect the same type of explanation to account for 
both hysterical conversion and anosognosia. drawing a parallel with anosognosia, 
which has been extensively studied, i will shed a new light on hysterical conversion 
and suggest that effingham is not so far from being hysterical.
HysterIcal paralysIs: organIc, 
feIgned, or delusIonal?
Hysteria has been the subject of controversy for many years. it has even been 
suggested that it does not exist (miller, 1999); however, it is not because one finds 
adequate organic causes that they do not exist. Some patients first diagnosed as 
hysterical had indeed been later found to suffer with an organic disease (Slater & 
glithero, 1965). However, it has been evaluated that only 1–5% of patients diag-
nosed as being hysterical may present with an underlying occult organic cause 
(Crimlisk et al., 1998; Stone, Sharpe, rothwell, & Warlow, 2003). in addition, 
brain imaging techniques have recently provided an objective assessment of the 
reality of hysterical symptoms (Spence, Crimlisk, Cope, ron, & grasby, 2000). A 
better understanding of hysteria is thus required—even more so because of the 
frequency of hysteria in clinical practice (from 1 to 4% of all diagnoses in hospitals 
in Western countries). Hysteria exists, raising a number of fascinating questions 
about its origins and mechanism.
A variety of explanations have been provided during the nineteenth century 
(for review, see mace, 2001). First conceived as resulting from an increased excit-
ability of the nervous system, hysteria was soon considered to be a functional rather 
than a structural disorder (Charcot, 1889). Psychological accounts emphasized the 
triggering role played by emotions (Carter, 1853) or by the unconscious residuum 
of a “fixed idea” (Janet, 1907). Freud (1894) provided a synthesis of these different 
dimensions. in hysteria, a psychological trauma, probably of sexual origin, is ren-
dered innocuous by converting it into somatic disorders.
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nowadays, hysteria is referred to as “conversion disorder” in the fourth edition 
of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (dSm-iV) and classified under the somatoform disorders. it is 
characterized by three key features:
 1. the patient has symptoms similar to those encountered in physical illness 
(e.g., paralysis or anesthesia) that cannot be explained by organic neuro-
logical lesions or medical diseases.1
 2. the patient experiences these functional disorders as real symptoms over 
which he or she has no voluntary control. Patients are not malingering.
 3. Because the symptoms have no organic cause, they must have psychologi-
cal causes. they may result from the conversion of psychological trauma.
the difficulties raised by the diagnosis of hysteria are compounded by the fact that 
symptoms vary from one patient to the other. Here i will limit myself to hysterical 
paralysis. i will leave open the question of other kinds of hysteria.
Patients with hysterical paralysis cannot produce voluntary movements. they 
feel paralyzed. However, hysterical paralysis differs from organic paralysis at the 
neural level and at the behavioral level. At the neural level, motor pathways are 
intact. When asked to move, contractions of agonistic and antagonistic muscles 
are found (merskey, 1995). Hysterical patients also show normal and symmetric 
motor-evoked potentials (mePs) when transcranial magnetic stimulation is applied 
over the motor cortex (magistris, rosler, truffert, Landis, & Hess, 1999; meyer et 
al., 1992).
At the behavioral level, hysterical patients do not display the same motor 
deficits as neurological patients. According to Freud, the symptoms in hysterical 
paralysis are limited to restricted parts of the body and they are characterized by 
excessive intensity. Furthermore, hysterical motor behaviors suffer from a lack of 
consistency. For example, patients with hysterical aphonia may be unable to whis-
per, but able to cough (Spence, 2001). the degree of disability varies depending on 
the social context and the patient’s emotional state. one can even pharmacologi-
cally induce temporary remission: A patient with hysterical quadriplegia showed 
restored movements under diazepam (ellis & Young, 1990). Patients may also pro-
duce normal movements when asleep. in addition, when applying Hoover’s test, the 
“paralyzed limb” moves when the contralateral (“healthy”) limb is flexed and the 
patient is distracted (Sonoo, 2004). it has thus been suggested that the dysfunction 
is limited to voluntary movements and does not affect automatic reflex movements 
(Athwal, Halligan, Fink, marshall, & Frackowiak, 2001; Spence, 1999).
one may therefore wonder whether patients are not feigning their paralysis 
because of the secondary gain that they would obtain for being ill. individuals 
who feign paralysis may indeed display the same inconsistency of performance. 
However, it has been shown that hysterical paralysis does not activate the brain 
areas that are activated by feigning motor weakness (Spence et al., 2000). three 
patients with hysterical weakness were compared with four healthy control sub-
jects who were instructed to feign motor weakness. All participants had to perform 
movements with their affected (or pseudo-affected) hand. As a group, patients with 
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conversion disorder showed decreased activity in left prefrontal cortex relative to 
the control feigners; feigners showed decreased activity in right prefrontal cortex 
relative to conversion patients.
Hysterical paralysis cannot be confused with organic paralysis or with feigned 
paralysis. rather, one may interpret it as a case of delusional paralysis. Hysterical 
patients would have the delusion that they are paralyzed—in the same way that 
anosognosic patients have the delusion that they are not paralyzed (davies, Aimola 
davies, & Coltheart, 2005). What exactly would be the content of their delusion? 
Hysterical patients believe that they cannot make any movement due to an organic 
cause. Hysteria differs from anosognosia in that part of the hysterical patients’ 
beliefs is true. it is true that they cannot make voluntary movements. However, it is 
false that they cannot make any movement and it is false that it is due to an organic 
cause. this ambivalence explains why it is difficult to classify hysterical conversion 
as a pure case of delusion. delusions are defined as false beliefs firmly sustained 
despite obvious proof or evidence to the contrary (dSm-iV). they are associated 
with a strong feeling of conviction and are often characterized by a lack of appro-
priate affect and a lack of influence on practical reasoning.
Just based on these two latter criteria, one can see that hysterical paralysis 
displays heterogeneous features. on the one hand, it is true that hysteria is often 
associated with a lack of emotional concern relative to the symptoms (i.e., “la belle 
indifference”). on the other hand, patients act in the ways in which they ought to 
act if they believed their delusion. they go to hospital to be diagnosed and cured. 
However, they do not believe physicians when they find no organic cause. they 
maintain their belief against what almost everyone else believes. their experience 
of their inability to move overwhelms all the scientific medical evidence that can 
be provided. they are convinced that there must be a physical cause that explains 
their paralysis. therefore, they have a false belief, and as such they can be con-
sidered as delusional. However, their delusion is partly—but not fully—justified. 
they have good reasons to believe that they are physically paralyzed because de 
facto they cannot move. their paralysis is, however, limited to voluntary move-
ments and it cannot fully justify their belief in a complete organic paralysis. i will 
come back later to the justification of their belief.
HysterIa and anosognosIa
the inconsistency of motor behavior and the differences in brain activity have 
shown that hysterical paralysis cannot be explained by a hidden organic cause or by 
a tentative of malingering and deception from the patient. it needs its own account. 
For a long time, it has been the privilege of psychoanalytic theory. However, with 
the recent development of cognitive psychiatry (david & Halligan, 1996), one may 
understand psychiatric and organic delusions within the same conceptual frame-
work (davies et al., 2005; Frith, 1992).
Here i will contrast hysterical conversion with anosognosia.2 they are indeed 
remarkably similar, though the content of their respective delusions is the opposite. 
in both cases, patients do not move. However, in hysterical conversion, patients 
are not aware of their preserved ability, whereas in anosognosia, patients are not 
AU: missing word 
(“diagnosis”?)
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conversion disorder showed decreased activity in left prefrontal cortex relative to 
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anosognosic patients have the delusion that they are not paralyzed (davies, Aimola 
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Hysterical patients believe that they cannot make any movement due to an organic 
cause. Hysteria differs from anosognosia in that part of the hysterical patients’ 
beliefs is true. it is true that they cannot make voluntary movements. However, it is 
false that they cannot make any movement and it is false that it is due to an organic 
cause. this ambivalence explains why it is difficult to classify hysterical conversion 
as a pure case of delusion. delusions are defined as false beliefs firmly sustained 
despite obvious proof or evidence to the contrary (dSm-iV). they are associated 
with a strong feeling of conviction and are often characterized by a lack of appro-
priate affect and a lack of influence on practical reasoning.
Just based on these two latter criteria, one can see that hysterical paralysis 
displays heterogeneous features. on the one hand, it is true that hysteria is often 
associated with a lack of emotional concern relative to the symptoms (i.e., “la belle 
indifference”). on the other hand, patients act in the ways in which they ought to 
act if they believed their delusion. they go to hospital to be diagnosed and cured. 
However, they do not believe physicians when they find no organic cause. they 
maintain their belief against what almost everyone else believes. their experience 
of their inability to move overwhelms all the scientific medical evidence that can 
be provided. they are convinced that there must be a physical cause that explains 
their paralysis. therefore, they have a false belief, and as such they can be con-
sidered as delusional. However, their delusion is partly—but not fully—justified. 
they have good reasons to believe that they are physically paralyzed because de 
facto they cannot move. their paralysis is, however, limited to voluntary move-
ments and it cannot fully justify their belief in a complete organic paralysis. i will 
come back later to the justification of their belief.
HysterIa and anosognosIa
the inconsistency of motor behavior and the differences in brain activity have 
shown that hysterical paralysis cannot be explained by a hidden organic cause or by 
a tentative of malingering and deception from the patient. it needs its own account. 
For a long time, it has been the privilege of psychoanalytic theory. However, with 
the recent development of cognitive psychiatry (david & Halligan, 1996), one may 
understand psychiatric and organic delusions within the same conceptual frame-
work (davies et al., 2005; Frith, 1992).
Here i will contrast hysterical conversion with anosognosia.2 they are indeed 
remarkably similar, though the content of their respective delusions is the opposite. 
in both cases, patients do not move. However, in hysterical conversion, patients 
are not aware of their preserved ability, whereas in anosognosia, patients are not 
aware of their disability. the dissociation between ability and awareness concerns 
the same domains in both syndromes: anesthesia, amnesia, aphasia, blindness, 
and paralysis. it is also interesting to note that there is evidence that both syn-
dromes affect the left limbs more than the right limbs (gagliese, Schiff, & taylor, 
1995; galin, diamond, & Braff, 1977; Pascuzzi, 1994; Stern, 1983), although a 
recent meta-analysis has questioned the existence of such an asymmetry in hyste-
ria (Stone et al., 2002). Finally, both types of patients display an attitude of “belle 
indifférence.” their emotional attitude toward their handicap is not appropriate. 
in light of these considerations, it seems reasonable to consider anosognosia as a 
model of understanding of hysterical conversion. As with hysteria, i will focus on 
anosognosia for hemiplegia.
these last 20 years, there has been an extended literature on anosognosia. 
Patients who suffer severe deficits following brain damage remain unaware of 
their handicap and deny it. it was first described by Babinski (1914) to denote 
the loss of recognition of a hemiplegia. nowadays, it is encountered in at least 
20–30% of hemiplegics after an acute stroke (Stone, Halligan, & greenwood, 
1993). Although the underlying mechanisms of anosognosia are not yet fully 
understood, several accounts have been provided to explain how one can remain 
unaware of one’s handicap. Four main explanations have been provided to 
account for this disorder:
metacognitive account: Anosognosia results from the failure to inferen-•	
tially discover that one is hemiplegic (Levine, Calvanio, & rinn, 1991; 
ramachandran, 1995).
Attentional account: Anosognosia results from the lack of attention •	
towards one’s own body (Cutting, 1978).
motor account: Anosognosia results from the disruption of action moni-•	
toring (Heilman, 1991).
motivational account: Anosognosia results from a psychologically moti-•	
vated denial—an unconscious defense mechanism that attenuates the 
potential distress of hemiplegia (Weinstein & Kahn, 1955).
these explanations are not mutually exclusive. given the variety of cases in 
anosognosia, one can also expect a variety of explanations, and each case can 
involve several dysfunctions (davies et al., 2005). Here i do not intend to review 
them in detail or to take a side in the debate about the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for anosognosia. instead, i will analyze each account as it might apply 
to hysterical paralysis.
Beforehand, it is important to notice one main difference between anosognosia 
and hysteria. one can define anosognosia uniquely in terms of deficit (i.e., a deficit 
of awareness of hemiplegia). in contrast, hysteria is characterized not only by nega-
tive symptoms like hemiplegia, but also by positive symptoms like gait disturbance 
and tremor. most cognitive models focus on negative symptoms, and i will follow 
their lead here. it is less clear, however, how positive symptoms can be accommo-
dated by this neuropsychological approach. one should keep this in mind, even if 
one has no satisfactory account of positive symptoms.
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tHe MetacognItIve level
According to Levine et al. (1991), sensorimotor deficits are not phenomenologically 
salient and need to be discovered. in other words, one assumes that one is healthy, 
unless one is provided with evidence to the contrary. the default hypothesis is 
that one is not paralyzed. one needs to monitor one’s performance reflectively to 
detect anomalies. the presence of an anomaly provides no immediate awareness 
that one cannot move, and one will persevere in believing that one can move until 
one discovers by self-observation that this is not the case. ramachandran (1995) 
compares this discovery to a change of paradigm.
According to the metacognitive view, patients suffer from anosognosia because 
they have difficulties in discovering their deficit. this discovery is all the more 
difficult for them in the case of anosognosia for hemiplegia because hemiplegia is 
often associated with neglect, as we will see, and they can draw incorrect inferences 
about the affected side on the basis of the healthy side. Consequently, anosognosic 
patients do not switch to a new paradigm, although they have all the reasons to 
do so. What about hysterical paralysis? the reverse happens. Hysterical patients 
switch to a new paradigm, although they have no reason to do so. in hysterical 
conversion, the default rule is true. there is nothing to discover. Yet, patients do 
not believe the default rule.
there are at least two possible interpretations of this surprising change of para-
digm. First, patients cannot move. they do have a reason to give up the default 
rule. it makes sense for them to believe that they are paralyzed. this first inter-
pretation does not explain why hysterical patients cannot move, but only why they 
believe that they cannot move. in contrast, the second interpretation is less mod-
est and may help to account for the paralysis per se. one possibility is that self-
monitoring is disturbed. Patients draw incorrect inferences based on what they 
observe. they can move, but they do not realize that they can move. Because they 
believe that they cannot move, they do not intend to move and they do not move. 
the change of paradigm is then self-justifying. Although not justified at the begin-
ning, it is justified afterwards. Put another way, the change of paradigm is either 
the consequence of a motor deficit or its cause. to settle the debate between these 
alternatives, one needs first to review the different possible explanations of hysteri-
cal paralysis at the attentional, motor, and motivational levels.
tHe attentIonal level
one reason that could explain why both anosognosic patients and hysterical patients 
do not discover their respective state is that they do not get much information from 
their body due to sensory loss and/or attentional deficit. one consequence of the 
metacognitive view is indeed that the anomaly does not pop up in awareness. it is 
not always salient enough to attract attention, particularly if the sensory signal is 
weak. therefore, one needs to observe one’s performance, and if one does not, one 
will not form the correct beliefs about abilities and disabilities.
in support of the attentional view, it has been shown that anosognosia often 
co-occurs with sensory loss and unilateral neglect. interestingly, both neglect and 
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anosognosia are momentarily attenuated during vestibular stimulation (Cappa, 
Sterzi, Vallar, & Bisiach, 1987). in personal neglect, patients do not pay attention to 
the contralateral side of their body. For example, they may comb their hair only on 
one side. they may also not notice that half of their body is not moving. one may 
thus suggest that neglect contributes to the lack of awareness of paralysis in ano-
sognosia. As for hysterical paralysis, it has often been compared with motor neglect 
(Vuilleumier et al., 2001). in motor neglect, patients “forget” to use the contralat-
eral side of their body. For example, they may try to perform bimanual tasks by 
using their right hands only. Consequently, the left limbs never move because they 
are neglected. one may thus suggest that neglect contributes to the lack of aware-
ness of the preserved ability to move in hysteria.
According to this view, hysterical conversion is due to an attentional dysfunc-
tion resulting from an increase in inhibition of afferent stimulation, preventing 
the ongoing sensory or motor activity from entering awareness (Ludwig, 1972, 
oakley, 1999; Sierra & Berrios, 2001). Hysterical patients have indeed been shown 
to be impaired in a series of attentional tasks (Bendefeldt, miller, & Ludwig, 1976). 
more recently, a disruption of the evoked potential P300 associated with atten-
tional processing has been discovered in hysterical patients (Lorenz, Kunze, & 
Bromm, 1998). Subjects were repeatedly stimulated on the left hand and occasion-
ally received a “deviant” stimulus either on the right hand or on another finger 
on the left hand. the deviant stimulus elicited a P300 response for both hands in 
control subjects. However, a patient with hysterical anesthesia on the right hand 
showed no P300 response when the stimulus was applied on the right affected 
hand. the patient was not able to direct his attention to the novel stimulus when it 
was applied on the hysterical side.
However, the role of attention is controversial for both syndromes. on the one 
hand, Bisiach, Vallar, Perani, Papagno, and Berti (1986) showed double dissocia-
tion between neglect and anosognosia. neglect is not a necessary condition for the 
unawareness of hemiplegia. on the other hand, in hysterical conversion, several 
results show that there is no deprivation of information related to the body, in 
fact, quite the reverse. First, far from a somatosensory deficit, a preserved activ-
ity has been found in somatosensory primary areas Si and Sii, which is even 
slightly increased in comparison with the unaffected side (Hoechstetter, meinck, 
Henningsen, Scherg, & rupp, 2002). As for the attentional deficit, clinical reports 
reject it, emphasizing, on the contrary, the therapeutic importance of distracting 
the patient’s attention from his affected limb. As previously said, patients move 
their paralyzed limb when sedated or distracted (Spence, 1999). the principle 
underlying Hoover’s test is to direct the patient’s attention away from the affected 
limb: “the only necessary technique is to urge the patient to concentrate on the 
abducted [‘healthy’] leg and pay no attention to the unabducted [‘paralyzed’] leg” 
(Sonoo, 2004). this technique is consistent with studies showing that patients dis-
play an attentional bias toward their body.
in normal subjects, responses in somatosensory evoked potential and in skin 
conductance decrease over time after repeated identical stimulations. But in hys-
terical patients, there is no habituation effect (Horvath, Friedman, & meares, 
1980; moldofsky & england, 1975). they pay as much attention at the end of the 
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sequence as at the beginning. in addition, patients with somatoform disorders, 
such as hysteria, have a biased attention towards the tactile modality immediately 
following exposure to threatening body-relevant information (Brown, Poliakoff, 
& Kirkman, 2007). more controversially, it has also been found that patients with 
somatoform dissociations have higher scores on the SomatoSensory Amplification 
Scale (SSAS), which includes statements like the following (Barsky, Wyshak, & 
Klerman, 1990):
 1. Sudden, loud noises really disturb me.
 2. i am very uncomfortable when i am in a place that is too hot or too 
cold.
 3. i cannot stand pain as well as most people can.
 4. i find i am often aware of various things happening in my body.
 5. i am quick to sense the hunger contractions in my stomach.
to sum up, hysterical paralysis may result from an attentional disturbance, but 
the disturbance appears to be one of overattention, rather than underattention, 
to the body. in this proposal, patients would spend disproportionate amounts of 
time focusing on their bodies and scanning for evidence of disease, increasing the 
likelihood of finding evidence of bodily dysfunction (Brown, 2007).3 Whereas ano-
sognosic patients might be compared to lazy scientists who do not discover what 
is under their noses, hysterical patients are neurotic scientists who constantly look 
for evidence that is not there.
tHe Motor level
We have seen that attentional deficit cannot fully account for anosognosia. As an 
alternative explanation, it has been suggested that the origin of anosognosia for 
hemiplegia is a disruption of the motor system (Adair et al., 1997; Berti, Spinazzola, 
Pia, & Rabuffetti, 2007; gold, Adair, Jacobs, & Heilman, 1994, Heilman, 1991). 
According to Heilman (1991), the main proponent of this view, anosognosic 
patients have a deficit of intention. Similarly, since the nineteenth century, it has 
been defended to understand hysterical paralysis in terms of a “disorder of the 
will” (Spence, 2001): “it is not the muscles which refuse to obey the will, but the 
will itself which has ceased to work” (Brodie, 1837); according to Paget (1873), 
“they say, ‘i cannot’; it looks like ‘i will not’; but it is ‘i cannot will.’”
Both anosognosia and hysteria may be due to a lack of intention. But both 
types of patients report that they consciously intend to move. Are they lying or 
mistaken? not necessarily. it is important here to distinguish between two kinds 
of intention (Pacherie, 2000; Searle, 1983). Prior intentions represent the goal of 
the action as a global unit (e.g., “i intend to drink”). they are too rough grained 
to specify the movements that have to be performed. the motor system needs to 
anchor the prior intention in a specific context and to determine the means that 
will be required to reach the goal—that is, the intention in action. intentions in 
action represent the action as a dynamic sequence of specific movements (e.g., “i 
intend to reach the tap and to turn it clockwise with my right hand”). it initiates 
the action, guides it, and monitors its effects. According to the motor view, it is 
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only the intention in action that would be impaired, although this claim is rarely 
made explicit (Spence, 2001).
Several experimental results argue in favor of a deficit of intention in action for 
both anosognosia and hysteria. in anosognosia, it was found that a patient showed 
no activation of the pectoral muscles when asked to squeeze his left paralyzed 
hand, whereas he showed normal bilateral muscle activation when squeezing his 
right hand (gold et al., 1994). interestingly, the authors also tested hemiplegic 
patients without anosognosia, who showed normal bilateral activation for both 
hands. this was taken as evidence that the anosognosic patient was not even try-
ing to squeeze his hand. in hysterical paralysis, patients showed a hypoactivation 
of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex when asked to move, which prompted some 
to postulate a dysfunction of internal movement initiation (roelofs, van galen, 
Keijsers, & Hoogduin, 2002; roelofs, de Bruijn, & van galen, 2006; Spence, 1999; 
Spence et al., 2000). However, these results have not been replicable, and it is pos-
sible to question their interpretation.
For anosognosia, Berti et al. (2007) could not find abnormal muscle activation 
in her patients. As for hysteria, marshall, Halligan, Fink, Wade, and Frackowiak 
(1997) and Vuilleumier et al. (2001) found similar activation during action prepa-
ration and initiation in hysterical patients and healthy controls. they did not find 
hypoactivation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in patients. Furthermore, 
Vuilleumier (2005) noted that this hypoactivation might be related to depression, 
which is often associated with hysteria.
Here i do not intend to settle this debate, but rather to understand how an 
intentional deficit could lead either to anosognosia or to hysterical paralysis. What 
is surprising is that the very same deficit might be thought to induce delusions with 
opposite contents (i.e., “i can move” vs. “i cannot move”). Let us see first how it 
might work for anosognosia. the theoretical framework of the motor system posits 
two internal models (Wolpert, ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995). the inverse model 
simulates the execution of action, and the forward model anticipates the sensory 
feedback. When performing a movement, the expected state is congruent with the 
sensory feedback, indicating that i am moving as intended. if there is no intention, 
as in anosognosia, the motor system does not expect any sensory feedback indicat-
ing a movement and therefore does not signal that there is a discrepancy between 
the intention and the outcome. Consequently, the lack of movement does not chal-
lenge the default hypothesis (i.e., “i can move”).
What about hysterical paralysis? How can it be explained by a comparable lack 
of intention and a comparable lack of incongruence? the default hypothesis is the 
same: i can move. the outcome of the comparators does not convey any odd signal; 
the absence of movement is consistent with the lack of intention to move. Yet, the 
patient concludes that he cannot move. it is difficult to understand how one can 
reach such a conclusion on this basis. the content of hysterical delusions cannot be 
explained by an intentional deficit.
it is interesting to note here an asymmetry between ability awareness and dis-
ability awareness. i can conclude that i can move from the fact that i am moving. 
However, the reverse is not true: i cannot conclude that i am moving from the fact 
that i can move. Similarly, i can conclude that i am not moving from the fact that 
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i cannot move, but i cannot conclude that i cannot move from the fact that i am 
not moving. the logical link between action awareness and ability awareness is 
not bidirectional. the direction of the arrow changes for abilities and disabilities. 
the lack of action awareness does not suffice to conclude that i am paralyzed. i 
also need to be aware that i intend to move. it is only the discrepancy between my 
intention to move and the absence of movement that entitles me to conclude that i 
am paralyzed (or that there are external constraints preventing me from moving). 
A deficit of intention, as assumed by Spence (2001), prevents such justification for 
hysterical delusions without providing any other. it makes sense for anosognosia, 
but not for hysteria.
the problem may be, however, more downstream in the motor system, when 
the motor command is dispatched to the body. When comparing hysterical patients 
and healthy controls, different brain activations during action execution were found 
(marshall et al., 1997; Vuilleumier et al., 2001). there was a hypoactivation of exec-
utive motor areas in conjunction with increased activation of frontal and cingu-
late areas in hysterical patients. Hysterical paralysis may result from an inhibition 
of movement execution, rather than from a dysfunction of movement initiation. 
According to this explanation, patients with hysterical paralysis have the intention 
to move. the motor system predicts the sensory outcome of the movement, which 
is compared with the sensory feedback indicating the absence of any movement. 
there is a discrepancy (“i am not moving although i intended to move”) that chal-
lenges the default hypothesis. i am justified to conclude that i cannot move. the 
motor disruption is upstream in anosognosia with a deficit of intention, and it is 
more downstream in hysteria with a deficit of execution.
to sum up, whereas anosognosia can be understood in terms of a deficit of 
intention, this cannot account for hysterical paralysis. But perhaps hysterical paral-
ysis can be understood in terms of inhibition of intention execution. the disruption 
of execution explains why patients feel paralyzed, but one still needs to explain why 
execution is inhibited. one needs to go a step backward and understand the origin 
of the inhibition to give a full account of hysterical paralysis.
tHe MotIvatIonal level
there are at least two classes of explanation of delusion: motivational theories, com-
ing from the psychodynamic tradition, and deficit theories, coming from cognitive 
neuropsychiatry (mcKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, in press). motivational theories 
understand delusions as a mechanism of defense to relieve pain, tension, and anxi-
ety. deficit theories understand delusions as the result of abnormal perceptual 
experiences and cognitive deficits. the former provides a positive conception of 
delusions (by the emotional benefits they confer), whereas the latter provides a 
negative conception (as the side effect of the combination of deficits).
this debate is illustrated in anosognosia: As we have seen, anosognosia can 
be understood in terms of intentional and/or attentional deficits, but it has also 
been suggested that it results from the drive to be well and the preservation of 
self-esteem (Weinstein & Kahn, 1950; for review, see Aimola davies et al., this 
volume). this latter hypothesis has been criticized by Bisiach and gemiani (1991), 
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who showed that several characteristics of anosognosia could not be explained by 
motivational factors. Hysterical conversion has also been explained by motivational 
factors like secondary gain (e.g., avoiding military service). However, Freud him-
self, who is at the origin of the notion of secondary gain, did not believe that it 
could fully account for hysterical paralysis. Here i would like to provide an alterna-
tive explanation of hysterical conversion that takes into account affective factors, 
without falling back to the secondary gain theory.
interestingly, the debate between motivational and deficit theories has been 
until very recently a question of all or nothing. it was either all motivational or 
all dysfunctional. there was no middle ground. However, they are not incompat-
ible. Both can play a role in explaining the emergence and the maintenance of 
delusions (Aimola davies et al., this volume; mcKay et al., in press). motives can 
explain the credibility and saliency of delusional beliefs. they can also explain 
why patients prefer keeping their false beliefs, although they are rationally unten-
able. the fact that they play a role, however, does not imply that they are a suf-
ficient condition. According to this new theoretical trend, motives and deficits 
work hand in hand, but they do not interact with each other. Anosognosia can be 
understood as the summation of deficits of attention, intention, and memory plus 
voluntary denial to defend oneself against depressive overwhelm. However, there 
is no interaction between both types of factors. the treatment of evidence may be 
motivationally biased, but deficits are not motivationally triggered. in contrast, i 
would like to suggest here that motivational and affective factors are at the origin 
of motor deficits.
inhibition can be understood via a dual process of regulatory control—that is, 
executive inhibition and motivational inhibition (gray, 1982; Shallice & Burgess, 
1993). executive inhibition refers to deliberate suppression of motor behavior 
because of the context or competing goals. this inhibition is accompanied with rel-
atively low anxiety activation. it involves the same frontal–striatal–thalamic neu-
ral loops as executive function. motivational inhibition refers to anxiety-provoked 
interruption of behavior in the context of emotionally salient incentive cues. it 
invokes the activity of the limbic system and anterior cingulate cortex. this system 
detects and responds to immediate contextual cues for punishment, unexpected 
“mismatch,” or social unfamiliarity (nigg, 2003).
We said that hysterical paralysis results from inhibition of execution, but what 
type of inhibition—executive or motivational? Brain imaging studies might help us 
to decide. Hysterical patients display hyperactivity of the limbic system and of the 
anterior cingulate cortex (roelofs et al., 2006; Vuilleumier et al., 2001). the authors 
conclude that during action initiation, some signals are generated in the limbic 
and cingulate cortex due to affective and motivational factors that actively inhibit 
the motor cortex, preventing the execution of normal movements. Consequently, 
to explain the motor deficit in hysterical paralysis, one needs to take into account 
motivational factors. However, this does not mean that we are back to the second-
ary gain theory of hysteria. the motivations inducing the inhibition are of a com-
pletely different kind. instead, it has been suggested to compare hysterical paralysis 
with stereotyped modes of reactivity to environmental events that are perceived as 
stressful and hostile (Kretschmer, 1948; Vuilleumier, 2005; Whitlock, 1967).
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in recent years, ethologists working with nonhuman primates have established 
four distinct fear responses that proceed sequentially in reaction to increasing 
threat: freeze, flight, fight, and fright (Bracha, 2004; gray, 1982). the initial freeze 
response is the “stop, look, and listen” response associated with fear. Hofer (1970) 
exposed rodents to a variety of predator-related stimuli in an open space with no 
means of escape. All rodents entered a deep phase of freeze, persisting for up to 
30 minutes. the freeze response can constitute a survival advantage in some cases. 
Prey that remains “frozen” during a threat is more likely to avoid detection because 
the visual cortex and the retina of mammalian carnivores primarily detect moving 
objects rather than color. the next response is to flee; if that does not work, the fol-
lowing response is to fight. the last step in the sequence of fear-circuitry responses 
after fighting is tonic immobility, or “playing dead” (also referred to as fright). this 
response occurs during direct physical contact with the carnivore. tonic immobil-
ity may enhance survival when a predator temporarily loosens its grip on captured 
prey under the assumption that it is indeed dead.
From the outside, hysterical paralysis looks like freeze response and tonic 
immobility, both characterized by motor arrest and protective immobility, like 
effingham in The Unicorn. A basic function of the motor system of all animals 
is indeed to protect the body from attack and collision (Cooke & graziano, 2003; 
dosey & meisels 1969; Schiff, Caviness, & gibson, 1962). Animals can thus some-
times adopt awkward fixed postures while waiting for termination of the unfavor-
able situation (Klemm, 2001). it is interesting to note that the reactive response does 
not stop as soon as the threat stops. Animals exposed to significant shock stimuli in 
an escape-proof environment freeze with subsequent shock exposure. Subsequent 
introduction of routes of escape in these animals does not elicit escape behavior. 
the animals remain frozen and continue to exhibit helplessness (Seligman, 1975).
in addition, there does not need to be repetitive shock stimuli to establish the 
conditioned freeze response. in an event of great arousal and threat, only one trial 
may be enough (Scaer, 2001). in traumatized patients, it has been shown that any 
stimulus occurring in the peripersonal space where the person first experienced 
the threat (e.g., the approaching car) is conceived as threatening. As a result, pass-
ing a hand around the periphery of the patient’s visual field at the distance of 3–4 
feet will often produce an arousal response in the region of perception of prior 
threat, perpetuating the kindled trauma reflex (Scaer, 2001).
on the basis of these findings, it has been suggested that hysterical paralysis 
takes root in the primary stereotypical response to danger—that is, the freeze 
response (Vuilleumier, 2005).4 the lack of recovery from the freezing, also encoun-
tered in animals, is explained by long-term conditioning, which can be elicited by 
a single shock of great intensity. it is not surprising, therefore, that ambient stress 
often enhances the symptoms of hysterical conversion.5
How to BecoMe HysterIcal
two things need to be explained in delusions: (1) how the false belief is accepted 
as a serious and credible proposition, and (2) how the false belief is maintained 
despite evidence to the contrary. two-factor theories of delusions have suggested 
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that these two things demand independent explanations: the first factor triggers 
an initial implausible thought (and thus contributes towards explaining the the-
matic content of a particular delusion), and the second factor explains the uncritical 
adoption and maintenance of an implausible thought as a delusional belief (davies, 
Coltheart, Langdon, & Breen, 2001; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000). to provide a full 
account of hysterical paralysis, one needs therefore to specify both first and second 
factors. We have examined different disruptions that explain the etiology of the 
hysterical delusion. Let me recapitulate and articulate them. this would help us to 
understand the first factors.
Your attention is focused on your own body. You feel external stimuli as con-
stant threatening intrusions in your personal space. this elicits a high level of 
anxiety and automatic defensive reflexes to protect you from these external 
stimuli. this in turn inhibits your motor system. You cannot move anymore, 
although you intend to move (and you are aware that you intend to move). 
Based on the discrepancy between your intentions and the absence of move-
ments, you conclude that you are paralyzed. When you are distracted from 
your own body, you do not experience anxiety due to the danger threatening 
your body and, as a result, you are able to move.
in this model, can we still consider hysterical patients as delusional? 
disturbances of the attentional system and the motor system, due partly to affec-
tive factors, induce the inability to move. to conclude that one cannot move is 
therefore not a rationally untenable belief. it is credible and one does not need to 
appeal to further reasoning biases to explain it. the evidence is there: Patients can-
not make some movements. However, not only do they believe that they are unable 
to move now, but they also believe that they have a long-lasting paralysis due to 
an organic cause and that they cannot make any movement. in contrast, when 
we freeze in front of a danger, like effingham, we do not believe that we have an 
enduring clinical condition.
Hysterical patients therefore make two kinds of errors: first, about the extent 
of their paralysis—they overgeneralize based on restricted evidence and, second, 
about the source of their paralysis—they provide a fully unjustified account of the 
origin of their paralysis that goes against all the clinical evidence. Both compo-
nents of their delusional beliefs arise as normal responses to the unusual experi-
ence of their inability to move (maher, 1999). But why do patients maintain their 
belief that they suffer from a complete organic paralysis?
in the two-factor model, the answer to this question is provided by second 
factors. in anosognosia, the nature of the second factor differs from the nature 
of the first factor (davies et al., 2005). it corresponds to a deficit in the cogni-
tive mechanisms responsible for belief evaluation and revision, linked to working 
memory deficit. What about hysterical delusion? Hysterical patients do not reject 
their paralysis belief when clinical exams and diagnosis reveal the absence of any 
organic damage. Furthermore, their awareness of their ability to make automatic 
reflex movements should undermine their conclusion that they cannot move, but it 
does not; the delusion remains intact. Can this be explained on the sole basis of the 
first factors (i.e., somatosensory amplification combined with affective inhibition 
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of action)? or is there a need for a second factor of a different kind? What are the 
conditions of maintenance of the hysterical delusion?
the main evidence available to the patients that they are not paralyzed is that 
they can sometimes move. How do patients fail to realize that they are not par-
alyzed when they do see their limb stretching, as in Hoover’s test? it has been 
shown recently that patients have abnormal brain activations also when observing 
movements (Burgmer et al., 2006). this deficit is not surprising according to the 
mirror neuron hypothesis (rizzolatti, Fadiga, gallese, & Fogassi, 1995). if action 
execution and action observation activate the same brain areas, the deficit of the 
former must have consequences for the latter.
given the observation deficit, one may wonder what happens when the patient 
sees herself moving. one possibility is that she does not perceive the observed 
movement qua movement of her own body. the movement might be represented 
in the same way as the movement of a robot or the movement of the clouds in 
the sky. it would not be considered as a valid input for the motor system. the 
patient would not be aware of moving and therefore would not conclude that she 
can move. this is highly speculative, but it may explain why patients’ delusions 
are not disturbed by their automatic movements. Alternatively, we have seen that 
patients can move when they are distracted. they may therefore not notice their 
own movements because of their lack of attention.
A further difference between effingham and a hysterical patient is that 
effingham recovers very quickly and starts moving again. in contrast, the affective 
inhibition of action is constantly reactivated in the patient. Brown (2002, 2006) 
provides a model that explains the maintenance of medically unexplained symp-
toms by appealing only to primary factors. Because of somatosensory amplifica-
tion, patients constantly check whether the symptom is still present. in addition, 
they engage in a range of behaviors directed at bringing about symptom relief or 
reducing negative affect.
these illness behaviors and the anxiety induced by the symptoms increase 
attention to the body. the high level of body-focused attention in turn increases 
the activation of the representation of the symptom stored in memory and the like-
lihood of subsequent reselection, setting up a vicious cycle. in the case of hysterical 
paralysis, the anxiety brought about by somatosensory amplification induces action 
inhibition. Hysterical patients are not like effingham; they keep feeling threatened 
and therefore stay frozen. there is no need for a further explanation of why they 
maintain the belief that they are paralyzed. if, indeed, one remains unable to move 
for a long time, one is entitled to conclude that one is paralyzed. the maintenance 
of the inhibition suffices to account for the maintenance of the delusion. there is 
no need for a second, more cognitive factor, in contrast with anosognosia.
conclusIon
Hysterical paralysis is the reverse of anosognosia. in the latter, patients do not feel 
paralyzed, although they are physically unable to move; in the former, they feel 
paralyzed although they are physically able to move. At the metacognitive level, 
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anosognosia arises from a lack of change of paradigm, whereas hysteria arises from 
an unexpected change of paradigm. At the attentional level, anosognosia results 
from a deficit of attention toward the body; hysteria results from too much atten-
tion toward the body. At the motor level, anosognosia is caused by an upstream 
deficit of intention, whereas hysteria is caused by a more downstream deficit of 
execution inhibition. At the motivational level, anosognosia is due to the high-level 
drive to be well enhancing the credibility and the saliency of the delusional belief, 
but hysteria is due to low-level, anxiety-driven defensive responses inhibiting the 
motor system. Finally, anosognosic delusions require second factors to account for 
their maintenance, whereas hysterical delusions are justified beliefs and do not 
need such additional factors.
this account can explain hysterical paralysis, but does not pretend to explain 
other kinds of hysterical conversion, such as hysterical blindness. However, one 
may be able to shed a new light on this latter phenomenon by drawing the same 
kind of parallel, with Anton’s syndrome this time (i.e., visual anosognosia).
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notes
 1. Hysterical conversion may sometimes coexist with a real organic brain disease, but 
the lesion cannot explain the specific symptoms that are displayed. For instance, in a 
rehabilitation department, one third of the neurological patients exhibited at least one 
‘‘hysteria-like’’ behavior in addition of their neurological symptoms (eames, 1992).
 2. Alternatively, one may compare hysterical conversion with hypnosis (mcConkey, 
2001; oakley, 1999).
 3. Somatosensory amplification may account for the dissociation between voluntary and 
automatic movements. it would be only when patients consciously intend to move 
that they would pay too much attention to their body. the somatosensory amplifi-
cation would then result in the inability to move. during automatic movements, in 
contrast, one scarcely pays attention to one’s body.
 4. According to this view, inhibition of execution is merely an automatic reflex. in what 
sense then is it influenced by motivational factors? the underlying motive of the 
freeze response is to protect one’s own body. the freeze response has been selected 
by evolution for this purpose. the brain circuitry of action inhibition involved in hys-
terical paralysis is part of the motivational loop. But the inhibition is not under the 
patient’s voluntary control. one could claim that the evolutionary basis of hysterical 
paralysis is motivational, but not hysterical paralysis per se. Alternatively, one could 
emphasize that hysterical symptoms depend on the level of anxiety and thus that they 
directly result from the emotional state.
 5. interestingly, this explanation can account not only for negative symptoms of hys-
terical paralysis (e.g., inhibition of execution), but also for its positive symptoms (e.g., 
tremor).
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